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Electromagnetism is usually understood as a theory describing how charged par-
ticles and eletromagnetic elds interact. In this paper I argue that a double ontol-
ogy comprising both particles and elds is problematic. Either we should think of
electromagnetism as a theory about charged particles directly interacting with each
other, or as theory of elds whose local interactions are manifested as eld quanta,
called “particles.” From a purely theoretical point of view the choice between a par-
ticle and a eld interpretation does notmattermuchwhen it concerns classical elec-
tromagnetism; both interpretations are possible and, as shown by Quine, there is
a general method for translating a theory about one kind of objects into a theory
assuming another kind of objects, provided these theories are empirically equiva-
lent. From an empiricist point of view, however, the particle interpretation is the
choice, since some particles are directly observable. Testable predictions of electro-
magnetism are predictions of the motion of charged bodies, in theory represented
as particles, so this must be the empiricists’ choice of ontology. In quantum electro-
dynamics one is however forced to chose a eld ontology, since a particle ontology
for this theory is impossible. So called “quantum particles” are eld quanta, which
cannot be treated as individuals making up a domain of quantication. ere is
thus a tension regarding ontology between classical and quantum electrodynamics.
But this tension is nothing else than the much debated measurement problem of
quantum mechanics.
Keywords: ontology, electromagnetism, particle vs elds
1. Introduction. What is real: Particles, elds or both?
Some physicists hold that electromagnetic elds are not real, but merely cal-
culational devices; the electromagnetic eld at a certain point is nothing else
than an expression for the eect distant charged particles would have on a
charged particle placed at that point. For example Wheeler and Feynman
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(1949, 426) proposed quite some time ago such an interpretation of electro-
magnetism:
is description of nature diers from that given by the usual eld
theory in three respects: (1)ere is no such concept as “the” eld, an
independent entity with degrees of freedom of its own. (2)ere is no
action of an elementary charge upon itself and consequently no prob-
lem of an innity in the energy of the electromagnetic eld. (3)e
symmetry between past and future in the prescription for the elds
is not a mere logical possibility, as in the usual theory, but a postula-
tional requirement.
Others, in particular quantum eld theorists, such as Weinberg (1977, 23),
take the opposite view, holding that only elds exist:
e inhabitants of the universe were conceived to be a set of elds—
an electron eld, a proton eld, an electromagnetic eld—and parti-
cles were reduced to mere epiphenomena. In its essentials, this point
of view has survived to present day, and forms the central dogma of
quantum eld theory; the essential reality is a set of elds subject to
the rules of special relativity and quantum mechanics; all else is de-
rived as a consequence of the quantum dynamics of these elds.
Aphilosopher who has elaborated this eld view in a Kantian vein is Auyang
(1995). ere is also a third option concerning the ontology of electromag-
netism, viz., to hold that both charged bodies and electromagnetic elds ex-
ist. is appears to be a common view among both physicists and philoso-
phers, and, moreover, it is usually the view ofmany textbooks in electromag-
netism. Several philosophers have joined the debate, see for example Lange
(2002), Frisch (2005, 2008), Belot (2007), Muller (2007), Vickers (2008) and
Pietsch (2010).
In this paper I will argue:
i) A double ontology comprising both particles and elds is problem-
atic. Either we should think of electromagnetism as a theory about charged
particles directly interacting with each other, or as a theory of elds whose
local interactions are manifested as eld quanta, which are called “particles.”
ii) From a purely theoretical point of view the choice between a particle
and a eld interpretation does not matter much when it concerns classical
electromagnetism; both interpretations are possible and, as shown byQuine
(1981, 17–19), there is a general method for translating a theory about one
kind of objects into a theory assuming another kind of objects, provided
these theories are empirically equivalent.
iii) From an empiricist point of view, however, the particle interpreta-
tion is the choice, since some particles are directly observable. Testable pre-
dictions of electromagnetism are predictions about the motion of charged
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bodies and since bodies in theory are represented as particles, this must be
the empiricists’ choice of ontology.
Some say that we observe electromagnetic elds; but if saying so the
word “observation” must be taken in a broader sense. e simple fact that
the terms “electric eld” and “magnetic eld” were introduced by the found-
ing fathers of electromagnetism, Faraday and Maxwell, tells us that these
things at the beginning of the history of electromagnetic theory were highly
theoretical objects. at we now talk about eld values as observables in-
dicates that our inferences from direct observations to eld values are un-
controversial. However, the fact that eld values can be derived from direct
observations does not mean that elds are objects.
iv) In quantum electrodynamics one is however forced to chose a eld
ontology, since a particle ontology for this theory is impossible, as proved
by Malament and others. So called “quantum particles” are eld quanta, not
particles; such quanta lack identity criteria, which means that they cannot
be treated as individuals making up a domain of quantication.1
v)ere is thus a tension regarding ontology between classical and quan-
tum electrodynamics. But this tension is nothing else than themuch debated
measurement problem of quantum mechanics.
In section 2 I will rst discuss how wemay identify the ontological com-
mitments of a theory and present Quine’s method for changing ontology
between two empirically equivalent theory formulations. In section 3 I will
spell out how thismay be done in classical electromagnetism and in section 4
I will rehearse a recent debate about the consistency of classical electromag-
netism. e outcome of that debate was that the purported inconsistency
came from inconsistent ways of calculating the force on a charged particle;
in one expression the self-eld was included, in another not. Since self-elds
are necessary in a consistent theory, but conceptually awkward, if thought of
as entities distinct from their sources, I will in section 5 discuss the relation
between particles and elds and give my arguments against a double ontol-
ogy. In section 6 I argue that we in fact assume bodies in our ontology, since
it is these things we directly observe when testing our theories. In section
7 I will discuss the problem with a particle ontology in quantum electrody-
namics, concluding that elds are those entities we may accept as real and
that a particle ontology of relativistic quantum theory is impossible.
1 is does not contradict Wheeler and Feynman’s stance since their paper explicitly con-
cerns only classical electromagnetism.
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2. Ontological commitment
e theoretical skeleton of a physical theory consists of a number of equa-
tions relating physical quantities to each other and rules formeasuring these
quantities. ese equations and rules do not contain much of ontological
commitment, if anything at all. One may consistently accept electromag-
netism as a true theory, while denying that quantities are things, i.e., denying
that quantitative predicates refer to quantitative properties; from the truth
of a sentence of the form Fa, where “F” is a quantitative predicate such as
“. . .has charge q,” it follows that a exists, but not that F exists, hence predi-
cates need only have extension.
When we describe the content of these equations in complete sentences
we commit ourselves to some ontology. (Example: “e electromagnetic
eld at point x determines the motion of a charged particle at that point.”
e speaker of this sentence is committed both to the existence of an elec-
tromagnetic eld and of a particle.) We cannot avoid making some ontolog-
ical assumptions when we express an abstract theory in complete sentences.
But there is a slack here; when asserting the truth of an equation we can do
that in dierent ways, leading to dierent ontological commitments. e
ontological question related to electromagnetism may, therefore, be stated
as: Which things are we committed to accept as existing when we accept
electromagnetism as (approximately) true? Are there really any elds? Are
particles real? Do both elds and particles exist?
It is desirable to have a general methodology for answering these ques-
tions, and, luckily, one such is available.e rst stepwas proposed byQuine
quite some time ago in his (Quine 1976), which was a paper he read 1939 at
the h International Conference for the Unity of Science in Cambridge,
Mass. e idea is now well known, by Quine famously expressed as “To be
is to be the value of a variable.” In other words, we accept those things as
existing that are needed as values of variables in a theory we believe to be
true, when this theory is expressed in rst order predicate logic.
I fully endorse this principle and also Quine’s ensuing criterion for ac-
ceptance of a purported kind of entity, viz., that acceptable objects in our
ontology must satisfy an identity criterion, by Quine famously phrased as
‘No entity without identity.’2
An identity criterion tells us when two distinct singular terms refer to
the same thing. If this condition is not fullled, we can be certain to talk
2 Why not extend to second order logic and include quantication over properties and re-
lations? e short answer is that in so far as properties and relations can be reduced to
sets of objects and sets of n-tuples of objects it is superuous and when not we would by
this move accept intensional entities as values of variables and such entities have no clear
identity criteria. So I agree with Quine that we should restrict ourselves to rst order logic.
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about the particular thing a, only if we use the singular term “a.” But, is that
acceptable? I think not; if we only can refer to a by using “a,” a critic might
reasonably say that we have no reason to distinguish between the linguistic
item “a” and its purported reference, the object a, in cases where the pur-
ported referent is a theoretical, postulated entity.3,4
One cannot directly read o the ontology of electromagnetism from an
ordinary textbook, because there is no unique way of expressing the theory
in rst order predicate logic. It is possible to quantify over elds, over parti-
cles, or over both particles and elds. Which paraphrase should we choose?
is choice reects our ontological commitments.
Before we continue a comment about the word “particle” is in order. In
physical theories the word “particle” is oen used, but we should not inter-
pret it to mean an object without spatial extension. When occurring in an
expression such as “A particle with mass m and charge q. . . ” it cannot lit-
erally mean a point object, for if that were the case we would postulate an
object with innite mass (and charge) density and that conicts with phys-
ical theory. e reference of “particle” is simply an object about which we,
in a particular context, disregard its spatial extension and inner structure.
Wemerely assume it being conned to a certain volume and treat it as a unit
in interactions with other things, thus disregarding its spatial extension and
inner dynamics, if any such there is.
Hence, in classical mechanics and classical electromagnetism, the word
“particle” may be interpreted as referring to a body, a spatially extended ob-
ject which can be identied and later re-identied as the same body. (ese
things, moreover, are the ultimate things we observe when we submit our
theories to empirical testing.) By contrast, in quantummechanics and quan-
tum eld theory, the meaning of the word “particle” is a eld quantum; pho-
tons are quanta of the electromagnetic eld, electrons are quanta of the elec-
tron eld, etc, as Weinberg put it in the quotation above, and these quanta
do not in general satisfy any identity criterion.
Weinberg wrote that particles (in quantum eld theory) were mere
“epiphenomena” and I take him to mean precisely that they are not individ-
uals, only discrete portions of conserved quantities.
Some might wonder how discrete portions of a quantity could fail to be
individual things. Well, think of water: we usually do not ask whether a cer-
tain glass of water is the same glass of water as another one. A glass of water
is an amount of water, not an individual object. In most contexts we treat
3 e medieval notion of identity as haecceity, “thisness,” hence conicts with Quine’s de-
mand on identity.
4 Quine’s argument was dierent, he argued that we need an identity criterion for talking
about an entity because otherwise quantifying over a domain of objects makes no sense.
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it merely as a portion of the substance water. is does not contradict that
under certain conditions we can apply an identity criterion and ascertain
that two descriptions of a glass of water refers to the same water portion,
i.e., treating it as an individual. e same goes for portions of charge and
energy; generally speaking they are portions of quantities, whereas under
very specic conditions two descriptions of such a portion satisfy an iden-
tity criterion.e only dierence is that a glass of water can be divided into
smaller portions, whereas a photon or an electron cannot. Hence, the num-
ber of quanta in a system gives information about the amount of the relevant
quantity, not about the number of individual objects.
2.1 Alternating the ontology of a theory
We may adopt either an ontology of elds or an ontology of electrically
charged bodies as the entities talked about in classical electromagnetism;
as we will se below, both are possible and accepting electromagnetism as an
approximately true theory does not force us to make a choice. (But a par-
ticle interpretation of relativistic quantum theory is impossible, as will be
discussed in section 7.)
e general argument for such a possibility was given by Quine (1981).
He showed that a theory about a class of objects can be translated into an-
other empirically equivalent theory about another kind of objects usingwhat
he calls proxy functions. e idea is this: assume that in theory T1 a set of
objects {ai} are assumed to exist and being the values of the variables in T1.
Now assume someone has invented another empirically equivalent theory
T2 assuming another kind of objects {b j} being the values of the variabels
in T2. We can always construct a mapping, a proxy function f , from the set{ai} to the set {b j}.
Suppose the sentence P(x), being part of T1, is true of each member of
a subset {ak} of {ai}. e proxy function associates with each element in{ak} an element in {b j} such that true sentences P(x) in T1 are mapped
onto true sentences in T2.us the map of {ak} is a subset of {b j}.
e map of {ak}, i.e., a subset of {b j}, may not be the extension of a
single predicate dened inT2, but it is always possible to construct a complex
predicate with this extension using those dened in T2. e generalisation
to two-place, three-place, etc., predicates is trivial. So true sentences in T1
are mapped onto true sentences in T2 and no observations can distinguish
these theories. As Quine (1981, 19) put it:
e apparent change is twofold and sweeping. e original objects
have been supplanted and the general terms reinterpreted.ere has
been a revision of ontology on the one hand, and of the ideology, so
to say, on the other.ey go together.
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is procedure is always possible so long asT1 andT2 are empirically equiva-
lent and wemay accept Quine’s conclusion that “Structure is what matters to
theory and not its choice of objects.” (Quine 1981, 20). We may in fact with
good reason further say that the two theories are merely two formulations
of the same theory. eories are abstract things and why not use empirical
equivalence as identity criterion for theories?
e structure thatmatters to electromagnetismare the fundamental laws,
i.e., Maxwell’s equations + Lorentz law. Maxwell’s equations state relations
between electromagnetic quantities and Lorentz’ law together withNewton’s
second law connect these electromagnetic quantities to the directly measur-
able quantities mass and acceleration attributable to observable bodies.
is connection provides electromagnetic theory with an empirical founda-
tion of observations.
3. Semantics of classical electromagnetism
Accepting a law as true does not entail that we must accept that the general
terms used in that law refer to universals; it suce that these general terms
have extension. So if we assume that charged particles, i.e. bodies, exist and
are the referents of singular terms, we may consistently hold electromag-
netism to be true while denying both that electromagnetic elds and charges
exist; they aremerely attributes of bodies. Another option is to quantify over
elds instead of particles.
Let us, as an example, see how this may be applied to Maxwell’s rst
equation and express it in rst order predicate logic. I begin with its integral
form: ∬
S
EdS =∭
V
ρdV (1)
is equation says that the total ux of the electric eld E through a sphere S
enclosing a space volumeV equals the volume integral of the charge density
ρ.5 is volume integral equals the total charge q in that volume. Assuming
that charges are attributes of bodies and that we always can separate bodies
from each other so that a body can be thought of being alone inside a sphere,
wemay now expressMaxwell’s rst law as a statement about charged bodies:
Maxwell’s rst equation: For all charged bodies x, the charge q of
x satisfy the equation q = ∬S EdS, where S is a closed surface sur-
rounding x and no other charged body is inside S.
5 e expression “ux of electric eld” is commonbutmisleading, since it invites the thought
that the electric eld is something that can “ow” from point to point, i.e., that it is a kind
of substance. But that is wrong.
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Here I have tried to express the tacit assumptionsmadewhenusingMaxwell’s
equation for calculating elds and/or charges. e crucial thing is that “q”
is a parameter, determined by the volume integral of charge, not a variable
bound by a quantier. Hence we do not assume that it refers to a quantity.
e label “q” is in a concrete case replaced by a number expressing the quan-
tity of charge attributed to a body and quantities, i.e., quantitative attributes,
are not assumed to be entities. Similarly for electric eld; it may be viewed
as a quantitative attribute of bodies, not a thing that we need to accept as
existing.
Maxwell’s rst equation is a fundamental lawof electromagnetism. Hold-
ing this version of it true entails that we accept that the following two con-
ditions are satised:
1. ere exists charged bodies which are the referents of x.
2. ese bodies satisfy the predicate ‘x has a charge q that satisfy the
equation q = ∬S EdS, where S is a closed surface surrounding x.’
It is thus not assumed that the expressions “q,” “E” or “∬S EdS” re f er to any
properties; what is needed is onl y that these predicates have extension, i.e.,
are true of existing things.
Let us now turn to the dierential form of Maxwell’s rst equation:
▽E = ρ
є0
(2)
is equation literary tells us that the divergence of the electric eld and the
charge density are proportional.e natural way of expressing it using rst
order predicate logic is:
Alternative formulation ofMaxwell’s rst equation:e value of the
electric eld E at every point x is such that its divergence is propor-
tional to the charge density at that point.
Here we have switched ontology; we assume the existence of the electric
eld. Observe the denite article; electric eld is here treated as one single
object, in analogy with how we oen talk about substances, such as water.
Oen when we talk about water we mean all the water there is, treating this
totality as one single object.
One may observe that eld values at dierent points are not treated as
individuals, it is the entire eld that is the object talked about. A eld is
identied by its value at each point in spacetime. It has no position in space,
it is literally everywhere.
One is prone to conclude that in this formulation we have added points
in space to our ontology. Whether this really is necessary or if points in space
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can be translated to relational attributes to bodies is a topic for debate, but
this is not the place to discuss this further.
Since we know that the dierential and the integral form of Maxwell’s
equation are two formulations of the same law, we have a clear case of swap-
ping ontologywithout changing neither the structure, nor the empirical con-
tent, of the theory.
Without going through the same procedure with the other laws of elec-
tromagnetism I presume that this kind of reinterpretation between electro-
magnetism as a theory of charged particles and as a theory of elds is possi-
ble. Moreover, the very fact that one may disagree about the ontology with-
out disagreeing about electromagnetism’s empirical correctness illustrates
Quine’s point.
So wemay either interpret electromagnetism as a theory about particles,
or about the electric andmagnetic elds. But why not say that both particles
and elds exist?is seems to be the common view among physicists. How-
ever, I see a conceptual problem in doing so. is problem is most clearly
seen by considering the status of so called self-elds. is brings us to a
recent debate concerning a purported inconsistency of classical electromag-
netism.
4. Inconsistency of classical electromagnetism?
Mattias Frisch (2005, 32–34) argues that classical electromagnetism is incon-
sistent. He states four premises, all held to be true in electromagnetism, that
entail a contradiction:
1. ere are discrete nitely charged particles.
2. Charged particles function as sources of electromagnetic elds in
accord with Maxwell’s equations.
3. Charged particles obey Newton’s second law (and thus in the ab-
sence of non-electromagnetic forces, their motion is governed by
the Lorentz force law).
4. Energy is conserved in particle-eld interactions, where the energy
of the electromagnetic eld and the energy ow are dened in the
standard way.
Belot (2007) and Muller (2007) have both discussed this argument and ar-
rived at roughly similar verdicts: the formal derivation of the contradiction
is correct, but the inconsistency comes from an inconsistent application of
E, i.e., the electromagnetic eld, in the equations.eir argument is in short
34 The Ontology of Electromagnetism
that Frisch in one expression for the energy assumes that the force on a
charged particle depends on the total electric eld:
F = q(Etot + v × B) (3)
where Etot = Eext + Esel f , i.e., the total eld acting on the charge is the sum
of the eld from other charges and the self-eld emanating from the very
charge itself, whereas in another expression for the energy he in fact uses
only the external eld in calculating the force and hence the energy. No
wonder that an inconsistency arises.
One may think that there is something shy about the idea of a charged
particle acting on itself via its self-eld, hence that Lorentz law explicitly and
consistently should be expressed as that the force on a particle is produced
only by external elds. Feynman et al. (1964, sec. 28.5) discusses this solu-
tion, but immediately rejects it:
However, we have then thrown away the baby with the bath! Because
the second term in Eq. (28.9), the term in ...x , is needed. at force
does something very denite. If you throw it away, your’e in trouble
again. When we accelerate a charge, we must require more force than
is required to accelerate a neutral object of the same mass; otherwise
energywouldn’t be conserved.e rate at whichwe dowork on an ac-
celerating chargemust be equal to the rate of loss of energy per second
by radiation. . . .We still have to answer the question: Where does the
extra force, against which we must do this work, come from? . . .For
a single accelerating electron radiating into otherwise empty space,
there would seem to only one place the force could come from—the
action of one part of electron on another part.
So consistency demands of us that we hold that the self-eld contributes to
the force on a charged particle. e somewhat astonishing fact is that even
in the absence of external elds it requiresmore work to accelerate a charged
particle than an uncharged particle with similar mass! (See also Bauer and
Dürr (2001,eorem 1 and Lemma 5) or Komech and Spohn (2000, propo-
sition 2.3) for a proof of the need to take self-elds into account.)
One may observe Feynman’s last phrase “the action of one part of the
electron on another part.” us he does not conceive of the self-eld as
something distinct from the charged particle, it is “another part” of it. One
may assume that Feynman adheres to a ontology purely of particles, think-
ing of elds only as calculational devices, as he did in his joint paper with
Wheeler, quoted above. Adopting this view, one might, instead of talking
about self-elds, distinguish between the bare mass and the invariant mass
of a particle.e dierence between these numbers is equivalent to the eect
of the self-eld in the calculations of force and energy.
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is view is plausiblewhenwe think of classical electromagnetism, where
we may assume that the word “particle” refers to a body, an extended object.
However, Feynman’s application to electrons (in the quote above) is trou-
blesome, as we shall see when discussing relativistic quantum eld theory;
electrons cannot be conceived as individual objects, they are merely eld
quanta.
5. Why not a double ontology?
Belot (2007, 268), in contrast to both Feynman andWeinberg, adopts a dou-
ble ontology:
e Maxwell-Lorentz equations (under the present understanding)
describe a genuine interaction between the electromagnetic eld and
a charged particle that already treats the self-eld of the particle.
Belot’s position seems to be the common one; the real world is populated
both by charged particles and electromagnetic elds (including self-elds)
and electromagnetism is a theory describing how these entities interact. But
I beg to disagree! If talk of interaction, exchange of energy, is to have any
meaning one must be able to identify the interacting objects independently
of each other.is is impossible when it comes to the self-eld of a charged
particle; the only way to identify the self-eld is by determining it by its
source, the charged particle.is is the reason, one might think, why Feyn-
man (in the quotation above) holds that the self-eld is a part of the particle.
It is deeply confusing to say that a particle interacts with itself via its self-
eld. Instead we should either say that elds exist and charge densities are
attributes of the elds, or that charged bodies exist and elds are attributes
of these bodies. As was shown at the beginning of section 3, in neither case
are we forced to say that attributes exist.
is conclusion should be rather straightforward already when looking
at Maxwell’s rst equation; knowledge about the ux of E through the sur-
face of a closed area determines the charge inside that surface, and vice versa.
Neither the eld, nor the charge, has any further relevant properties enabling
us to treat them as entities distinct from each other. is makes it hard, I
would say impossible, to think of the relation between charge and eld as
a causal relation between dierent things, nor as some sort of interaction
between them, for the same reason.
It is oen said that charges are the sources of electric elds.is should
not be interpreted in causal terms, neither should it be viewed as stating
the ontological priority of charges over elds. If it is to have any signicance
whatsoever, I take it as indicating an epistemological point: knowledge about
charges enables us to infer values of the electric eld at dierent points and
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the word “charge” is usually used as an abbreviation for “charged body,” a
term that sometimes refers to a thing we are able to observe directly. But,
perhaps, source-talk is merely a manner of speaking.
Taking a single-ontology view, either conceiving elds as attributes of
charged particles, or charges, i.e., charged particles, as attributes of elds, it
is immediately clear that we must include the so-called “self-eld” term in
the expressions for E, in order to have a consistent theory.is is ok so long
as we do not view the relation between self-eld and charge as an interaction
between dierent things.
My conclusion, so far, is that of the three possible ontologies for classical
electromagnetism we should reject the particle-and-eld ontology as deeply
troublesome; either we should conceive electromagnetism as a theory about
particles or about elds. We may switch between a particle ontology and
a eld ontology, but we should not think of these two kinds of entities as
interacting with each other.
ere is profound analogy in this respect between Maxwell’s equations
and Einstein’s eld equations, the fundamental law of general relativity the-
ory:
Rµν − 12 gµνR + gµνΛ = 8piGc4 Tµν (4)
ese 16 equations (both µ and ν take the values 0, 1, 2, 3) may be interpreted
as stating that two quantitative descriptions of the world, the stress-energy-
tensor Tµν and the spacetime description Rµν− 12 gµνR+ gµνΛ, i.e., a function
of the metric tensor gµν, are proportional. By itself eq. (4) does not say that
the universe consists of two interacting entities, matter-energy and space-
time. Nor is there anything in this equation suggesting a causal mechanism
going from matter-energy distribution to the spacetime geometry, or vice
versa.
When expressing the content of these equations in complete sentences
with subject-predicate structurewe either say something like “thematter/en-
ergy of the universe has a certain spacetime-structure” or “the spacetime
structure of the universe has a certainmatter-energy distribution.”e point
is that by itself, eq. (4) does not determine what to treat as object of predica-
tion and what to treat as attribute. Similarly, we may swap between charged
particles and elds as objects of predication.
We may say that in modern theoretical physics the distinction between
object and attribute is merely a matter of linguistic convention, necessary
for formulating declarative sentences, but not reecting any physical fact.
(I am repeating the point made in section 3.) e core feature of physical
equations is that they state relations between physical quantities. However,
when we submit our theories to empirical testing we need to identify objects
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which can be attributed values of quantities. So the question is: what kind
of objects do we need when expressing observations supporting our theory?
6. What do we observe?
Physics, like any empirical theory, must make contact with the external re-
ality as observed by us humans. And what we observe, independently of
any theory, are rst and foremost medium sized bodies. (In experiments we
observe detectors, and these are medium sized bodies.) No matter what we
think of the causes of bodies’ motions, of charges, electromagnetic elds or
whatsoever, we easily agree on statements about positions and state changes
of visible bodies. In classical mechanics and classical electromagnetism such
bodies are represented as particles, so particles are unavoidable in our on-
tology. By contrast, elds are never directly observed; the values of electric
and magnetic elds are inferred from observations of states of bodies. So
we need bodies in our ontology anyway; this is a fact about ourselves as ob-
servers of the external world.
is conclusion may seem to conict with Quine’s ontological relativ-
ity, the stance that ontology is relative to choice of predicates used in our
preferred theory formulation. But in fact it does not. e fact that we can
use proxy functions for translating true sentences in one theory, or in our
vernacular language, into true sentences in an empirically equivalent the-
ory is certainly correct. is, however, does not conict with the empirical
fact that we humans express our observations in our natural languages by
discerning bodies and saying things about them.
How do I know that we all do that? Well, research on prelinguistic chil-
dren’s perceptual activities strongly indicates that babies long before they
master language are able to focus on moving bodies, they see continuously
existing physical objects that move. Here is one conclusion of such research:
A basic process for perceiving spatiotemporally connected and con-
tinuous objects arises early in development, without signicant tu-
toring. . . .is process is likely to be universal across human cultures,
leading all people to perceive, act on, and talk about the same spa-
tiotemporal bodies. (Spelke and Newport 1998, 297)
So we may, using empirical evidence, conclude that the ontology of our im-
mediate observation reports is an ontology of bodies and it is such reportswe
can agree upon, irrespective of theoretical convictions. Such reports make
up the intersubjective basis for science.
We can use proxy functions for translating this ontology to e.g. local
elds or, as in Quine’sWord and Object, from rabbits to time-slices of rab-
bithood. But anyone holding that elds, or some other arcane objects, are
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the ultimate building blocks of nature, must base his claim on empirical ev-
idence; and empirical evidence, when expressed as observation reports, is
expressed in terms of bodies.6
is empiricist stance does not entail that one rejects unobservable things
as non-existing; it onlymeans that one holds that all evidence for a theory ul-
timately consists of observations and wemay have strong evidence for many
not directly observable things.
ere is, however, ametaphysical argument for adopting a eld ontology
instead of a particle ontology in classical electromagnetic theory. For if we
conceive of the physical world as populated by particles, i.e., bodies conned
within well dened portions of space and interacting with each other, we
face the ancient-old conundrum: how could two things at dierent places
interact without anything in between transmitting the interaction? How is
action-at-a-distance possible? e desire to get rid of this conundrum has
been, I guess, a strong reason to adopt a eld ontology instead of a particle
ontology.
Our skepticism about action at-a-distance comes from a illicit tacit as-
sumption about space, viz., that it is a sort of “container” for physical events.
If we reject that picture and take relativity theory into account, we realise
that spatial distance is relative to observer.e objective distancemeasure is
the spacetime interval, and the spacetime interval between two events con-
nected by being the emission and absorption of one and the same photon
is zero. (And such exchanges of photons is the way bodies interact in elec-
tromagnetism.) ere is, from an observer independent point of view no
distance at all between these two events; in fact they might better be de-
scribed as two descriptions of the same event. (Cf. coin ipping: “heads up”
and “tails down” is the same outcome.) So I do not think we should take
action-at-a-distance in electromagnetism as a problem; it merely appears
problematic because we do not experience the fact that spatial distance is
observer-dependent.
is is inmy view the preferable ontology for classical electromagnetism.
But, alas, it does not hold water when we move to quantum eld theory, the
Lorentz invariant quantised version of electromagnetism.
7. Relativistic quantum electrodynamics
e particle interpretation of quantum theory has come under heavy criti-
cism from among others GerhardHegerfeldt (1998b,a) andDavidMalament
6 is conclusion contradicts Quine’s thesis of inscrutability of reference. Quine might be
right in holding that just by talking to other people and agreeing on the truth of occa-
sion sentences we have not sucient reason to conclude that others have bodies in their
ontology; but cognitive research has given us additional evidence.
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(1996).e latter argued that there can be no relativistic quantum theory of
(localisable) particles, which entails that quantum electrodynamics cannot
be interpreted in terms of particles.e paper started a debate and Halvor-
son and Clion (2002) has defended Malament against several objections.
Malament’s argument is based on four conditions, which seem entirely
reasonable demands on any relativistic quantum theory describing anything
that can be called “a particle.” e conditions are (M is Minkowski space-
time, U is a unitary operator, ∆ is a subset of M assigned to a projection
operator P∆):
1. Translation Covariance Condition: For all vectors a in M, and all
spatial sets ∆, P∆+a = U(a)P∆U(−a) (where ∆ + a is the set that
results from translating ∆ by the vector a).
2. Energy Condition: For all future directed, unit timelike vectors a in
M, if H(a) is the unique self-adjoint (“Hamiltonian”) operator sat-
isfying U(ta) = e−itH(a), the spectrum of H(a) is bounded below,
i.e., there exists a real number k(a) such that ⟨ϕ,H(a)ϕ⟩ ⩾ k(a) for
all unit vectors ϕ in the domain of H(a).
3. Localisability Condition: If ∆1 and ∆2 are disjoint spatial sets in a
single (common) hyperplane, P∆1P∆2 = P∆2P∆1 = 0
4. Locality Condition: If ∆1 and ∆2 are spatial sets (not necessarily
in the same hyperplane) that are spacelike related, then P∆1 P∆2 =
P∆2P∆1
e translation covariance and the energy condition are rather obvious
constraints on any relativistic theory.e localisability condition states what
wemean by a particle, viz., an object that can be found in a well dened por-
tion of space.e locality condition is weaker than the traditional condition
that no object can travel with innite speed. It merely says that the projec-
tion operators P∆1 and P∆2 commute, i.e., that the probability of detecting a
particle in ∆1 is statistically independent of whether a detection experiment
is performed in ∆2 and vice versa.
From these assumptions Malament proves:
eorem: If the structure (H, a ↦ U(a), ∆ ↦ P∆) satises condi-
tions (1)–(4), then P∆ = 0 for all spatial sets ∆.
Malament (1996, 6) comments:
We can think about it this way. Any candidate relativistic par-
ticle theory satisfying the four conditions must predict that, no
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matter what the state of the particle, the probability of nding
it in any spatial set is 0. e conclusion is unacceptable. So
the proposition has the force of a “no-go-theorem” to the ex-
tent that one considers (1) through (4) reasonable constraints.
Halvorsen and Clion points out that this does not show that it is impossible
to construct particles as supervenient on localised elds, but they formulate
a theorem, whichwith very reasonable assumptions excludes this possibility.
So an interpretation of electromagnetism that takes as its ontological ba-
sis electrons and other charged quantum particles, conceived as being con-
ned to denite volumes in space, is out of the question, if we represent states
of those particles by vectors in Hilbert spaces.e eld interpretation is the
only remaining option; a eld is by its very nature not conned to limited
portions of space, it does not satisfy the localisability condition.
is fact is related to another well-known feature of so called “quantum
particles,” viz., that in general they lack identity criteria.7 Since quantum
particles lack identity criteria, we cannot quantify over them and treat them
as objects interacting with other objects in quantum eld theory. (And this
is the fundamental reason, I think, why we got into the trouble with self-
elds.)
It has been argued, for example by Segal (1964) and Barrett (2001) that
empirical evidence supporting relativistic quantum eld theory consists of
observations of particles, i.e., objects being at a particular place at the time
of observation:
It is an elementary fact, without which experimentation of the usual
sort would not be possible, that particles are indeed localised in space
at a given time. (Segal 1964, 145).
Halvorsen and Clion comments:
It seems to us, however, that the moral we should draw from the no-
go theorems is that Segal’s account of observation is false. In particu-
lar, it is not (strictly speaking) true that we observe particles. Rather,
there are ‘observation events’, and these observation events are con-
sistent (to a good degree of accuracy) with the supposition that they
are brought about by (localisable) particles. (Halvorson and Clion
2002, 23)
I fully agree with Halvorsen and Clion: what we directly observe are state
changes in detectors, not particles. Such observations may be interpreted as
7 French andKrause (2006) discusses identity criteria in physics and entertain the possibility
of attributing quantum particles a primitive identity, a form of “thisness.” I do not see any
gain in accepting this proposal. It appears to me being a case of obscurum per obscurus.
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the presence of a particle in the detector, but it is not a logical consequence
of the observation sentence “the detector was triggered.”e eld interpre-
tation of triggering events, viz., that the detector absorbs quanta of external
elds, which are not localisable particles, is also possible. And I would say,
mandatory. If we assume that the detectionwas triggered by a particle which
was present in the detector at the moment of triggering, it must have been
present in a portion of space close to the detector not only at the moment
of detection but also just before; it follows that an object with a well dened
position at every moment in time moves from point to point in a contin-
uous trajectory. Hence, at the moment just before triggering the detector
it must have been present in another nearby portion of space, etc. In other
words, a particle must have followed a trajectory up to themoment of detec-
tion. But we know from interference experiments that that’s wrong; so called
“quantum particles” cannot be attributed denite trajectories. A particle in-
terpretation of the time evolution of a quantum system conicts with both
theory and experiment.e fact that quantum systems interact withmacro-
scopic devices at reasonably well dened portions of space only shows that
quantum systems interact as particles, not that they propagate as particles.
But also quantum eld theory is based on observations of bodies; so this
theory alone cannot fully account for its observational basis!8 is is the
(in)famous measurement problem of quantummechanics. I have elsewhere
(Johansson 2007, ch. 6) argued for a collapse interpretation of the measure-
ment problem, but this is not the place to dig into that topic further.
us, we should be careful to distinguish classical and quantum contexts
when using the word “particle.” In the classical domain it means a body
where we disregard its extension and inner structure but attribute a denite
trajectory to it, whereas in the quantum realm the word “particle” and its
cognates (electron, photon, etc.) signies a portion of a conserved quantity,
a eld quantum, lacking identity and well dened trajectory.
8. Summary
e natural and common interpretation of classical electromagnetism as de-
scribing how charged particles interact with electromagnetic elds is in my
view untenable. Particles and elds cannot be thought of as interacting
things; either we should think of elds as calculational devices; the electric
8 In the Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics it is taken for granted that there are
particles that followdenite trajectories and that these particles are guided by “pilot waves.”
In other words, they postulate some new kind of interaction between particles and pilot
waves without telling us how this might work, nor do they predict any new observable
phenomena. It is not a h kind of interaction beside the four hitherto known. In my
view, Bohm’s followers get more problems than those they attempt to solve.
42 The Ontology of Electromagnetism
eld at a certain point is a description of the eects of distant particles may
have on a test particle at that point, or we may take the opposite view by
holding that talk about charged particles are nothing else than descriptions
of electric elds. From a purely theoretical point of view both positions are
possible. But since bodies are fundamental from an epistemological point of
view, and bodies are represented in classical electromagnetism as particles,
the choice for an empiricist must be to adopt particle ontology of classical
electromagnetism.
When moving to the quantised version of electromagnetism, quantum
eld theory, we must choose an ontology of elds because a particle in-
terpretation of a relativistic quantum theory is impossible. e relativistic
quantum theory cannot be viewed as consisting of particle-like objects with
well-dened spatial boundaries. But our evidence for this theory are obser-
vations of precisely such things, viz., observations of measurement devices.
So quantum eld theory, and in fact quantum theory in general, has a prob-
lem of giving an account of its empirical basis using only its own concepts.
is is the measurement problem.
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